Relying on a comprehensive data set of news releases, we construct monthly firm-level news sentiment scores during the 2000-2014 period and document a news momentum phenomenon that stocks with more positive news in the past generate more positive news in the future. We propose two hypotheses to explain this phenomenon and find that news momentum is driven by the persistence of firms' fundamentals instead of firms' information environments. A trading strategy, which combines a long position in a good-news quintile portfolio with a short position in a bad-news portfolio, generates 8.352 percent risk-adjusted return annually. This return anomaly appears on both news and non-news days. Overall, these findings suggest that the crosssectional prediction of news is not fully incorporated into the stock price by investors. , 2015, The governance effect of the media's news dissemination role:
Introduction
Over the past four decades, hundreds of anomalies have been uncovered in the cross-section of stock returns. Among potential explanations for cross-sectional predictability, mispricing is identified as the key one (e.g., Mclean and Pontiff, 2016; Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff, 2016) .
In particular, behavioral theories attribute mispricing to investors' inability to price news correctly (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999) . Because these theories typically take news as given, the property of news is left unexplored. Given price movement is a function of news, the predictability of news is essential to the understanding of return anomalies. In this paper we fill this void by examining the cross-sectional predictability of news.
Using a comprehensive news dataset collected by RavenPack, we construct a sample of real-time news releases for stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq over the 15-year period between 2000 and 2014. We focus on news articles commonly used by institutional and sophisticated individual investors. Specifically, RavenPack quantifies the positive (or negative) information (i.e., news sentiment score) in each news article based on professional algorithms.
For example, a news article on a corruption scandal involving a firm's executives is associated with a low news sentiment score, and a news article regarding the successful development of a firm's new product is associated with a high news sentiment score. Our main analysis is conducted at the monthly frequency. We aggregate news articles for each firm in a month and then calculate monthly news sentiment scores by averaging news sentiment scores over a month.
We perform the following analyses. First, we examine whether there is a cross-sectional pattern of news. Specifically, we construct monthly news portfolios by sorting stocks into five quintile portfolios based on their current news sentiment scores. We then compute the equallyweighted average news scores of each portfolio. We find that stocks in the highest news sentiment score portfolio outperform stocks in the lowest news sentiment score portfolio in terms of their news sentiment scores in the future, which is called the news momentum phenomenon.
This phenomenon is robust to various specifications such as the daily or weekly frequency, the inclusion of neutral news articles, negative or positive news sorting, and decile portfolios.
Second, we propose two hypotheses to explain the news momentum phenomenon. One view is that news momentum is driven by firms' information environments. For example, stale news is likely to be disseminated over and over again. The release of stale information is meaningful when some investor cannot appropriately distinguish between new and old information (e.g., Tetlock, 2011) due to limited attention or other reasons. Moreover, when insiders' disclosure preferences are not aligned with those of outside investors, various incentives can motivate managers to strategically disclose or withhold firm-specific information (e.g., Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009 ). These properties of news dissemination associated with information environments may induce news momentum that companies with more positive information continue to disseminate more positive news, and companies with less positive information continue to disclose less positive news. We call this view the information environment hypothesis.
One the other hand, news momentum could be induced by the dynamics of firms' fundamentals. It has been well documented that earnings are persistent and predictable (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, Clarke and Wright, 1979; Fama and French, 2000, 2006; Markov and Tamayo, 2006; Li, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2015) . If news articles fairly reflect firms' fundamentals, the persistent earning stream is likely to generate a persistent stream in sequential news releases.
More specifically, positive (negative) news is more likely to be followed by positive (negative) fundamentals, which is delivered in news. We call this view the fundamental hypothesis.
To test the two hypotheses, we start by checking whether news momentum concentrates among stocks with poor information environments proxied by small firm size, low analyst coverage, and less institutional holdings. Inconsistent with the information environment hypothesis, we find no systematic difference in news momentum between stocks with small firm size, low analyst coverage, and less institutional holdings and stocks with large firm size, high analyst coverage, and more institutional holdings. We move forward by testing whether news momentum is driven by firms' fundamentals. In supportive of the fundamental hypothesis, we find that firms with current good news scores have higher profitability or earnings surprises in the future. When we further decompose news into hard news (news is more relevant to firms' fundamentals) and soft news (news is less relevant to firms' fundamentals), we show that the fundamental prediction is mainly driven by hard news.
Finally, we investigate whether investors are aware of news momentum. If news momentum is correctly incorporated into the stock price, stocks in the highest news score portfolio should have similar future returns as stocks in the lowest news score portfolio. Interestingly, we find significant news-driven return predictability: the strategy that buys the good news portfolio and sells bad news portfolio generates a return of 8.35 percent per year. News-driven return predictability is only significant in short horizons and in stocks with poor information environments such as stocks with small firm size, low analyst coverage, and less institutional holdings. This is consistent with the mispricing view of return predictability.
In the context of mispricing, there are two forms of underreaction that can account for observed return predictability. The first form of mispricing is that market participants do not realize the presence of news continuation and underestimate the persistence of news (fundamentals). The other form is that investors underreact to current news and induce return continuation such as the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. To test two types of investor underreaction, we decompose future returns into returns on news days and non-news days. We show that news-driven return predictability is caused by underreaction to both news momentum and news itself.
Finally, we provide additional tests and show that the return predication of news is more pronounced for hard news than soft news and is robust to various specifications such as the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach, the daily or weekly frequency, the inclusion of neutral news articles, negative or positive news sorting, and decile portfolios.
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, our paper is related to the literature on the capital market impact of business media. The media disseminates or rebroadcasts a large amount of financial news or signals regarding to firms' earnings, management, and investment decisions, among others. These pieces of information affect investors' expectations about stock returns and may improve market efficiency. Indeed, a flood of research highlights the informational role of the media through various channels such as drawing attention (Fang and Peress, 2009; Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) , resolving information asymmetry (e.g., Tetlock, 2010), delivering fundamental information (e.g., Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy, 2008), or inflating market sentiment (e.g., Tetlock, 2007) . Our study documents a cross-sectional pattern of news and provides an asset pricing implication of the news pattern.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the predictability of stock returns based on news stories. Hillert, Jacobs, and Muller (2014) show that firms covered by the media exhibit stronger return momentum, indicating that news dissemination exacerbates investor biases.
Using a comprehensive sample of intraday firm-specific news data, Jiang, Li, and Wang (2015) decompose stock returns to news-driven and non-news-driven components. They find that the news-driven return is particularly pronounced for firms with less analyst coverage, higher volatility, and lower liquidity. This is consistent with imperfect investor reaction to news and limits to arbitrage. More broadly, using a sample of 97 stock return anomalies documented in published studies, Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2016) show that anomaly returns are seven times higher on earnings announcement days and two times higher on corporate news days. We offer a new insight that investors do not only misprice news but also misprice the cross-sectional pattern of news.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We explain the sample construction for the news variable and describe sample characteristics in Section 2. In Section 3, we examine news momentum and test two hypotheses on news momentum. In Section 4, we study the return prediction of news momentum. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 5.
Data, variable construction, and descriptive statistics

Data and sample
Our data come from a variety of sources. First, we obtain stock returns and market capitalization data from CRSP and firm fundamentals and earnings announcement data from Compustat. After merging the CRSP and Compustat data, our initial sample covers all common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (Nasdaq). We further require stocks to have the stock price greater than one dollar and non-missing information on market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio.
Then we obtain news data from RavenPack News Analytics, and include only firms with at least one news story covered by RavenPack. RavenPack is a leading global news database used by practitioners in quantitative and algorithmic trading and also by scholars in accounting and finance research (e.g., Kelley and Tetlock, 2013; Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2013; Schroff, Verdi, and Yu, 2014; Dai, Parwada, and Zhang, 2015, Dang, Moshrian, and Zhang, 2015; Jiang, Li, and Wang, 2015) . RavenPack collects and analyzes real-time, firm-level business news from leading news providers (e.g., Dow Jones Newswire, The Wall Street Journal, and Barron's) and other major publishers and web aggregators, including industry and business publications, regional and local newspapers, government and regulatory updates, and trustworthy financial websites.
Our final sample consists of 473,941 firm-month observations (2,662 firms on average) spanning from January 2000 to October 2014. The sample period is determined by the availability of RavenPack. In some of additional analyses, we also use a battery of firm characteristics including analyst coverage, institutional ownership, the return of asset, earnings surprises, idiosyncratic volatility, beta, past stock returns, and illiquidity (Amihud, 2002) . These firm characteristics either proxy for firms' information environments or predict stock future returns. Appendix A lists data sources for these characteristic variables.
News sentiment
Our analysis is conducted based on the enormous volume of news flows: 5,610,988 news articles in total, which is equivalent to about 31,522 news articles per month or 12 news articles per firm and month. To measure the informational content of a news article, RavenPack implements two steps. First, RavenPack classifies the news articles into news event categories according to the RavenPack taxonomy. Both the topic and a firm's role in the news article are tagged and categorized. For example, a news article with the headline "IBM Completes Acquisition of Telelogic AB" is categorized into the "acquisition" event, and tagged as "acquisition-acquirer" for IBM and as "acquisition-acquiree" for Telelogic AB. Similarly, a news article titled "Xerox Sues Google over Search-Query Patents" is categorized into the "patentinfringement". Xerox has the tag "patent-infringement-plaintiff" while Google obtains the tag "patent-infringement-defendant". All the news articles in our study can be grouped into 32 news categories, which are listed in Appendix B. Among all news stories, the top five news categories are "earnings" (19.55%), "insider-trading" (14.07%), "products-services" (8.47%), "technicalanalysis" (7.42%), and "order-imbalances" (6.99%).
Second, RavenPack constructs the news sentiment score for each news article based on professional algorithms, which were developed and evaluated by effectively combining traditional language analysis, financial expert consensus, and market response methodologies. 1 Specifically, the news sentiment score indicates whether or not, and to what extent a news story may have a positive, neutral, or negative effect on stock prices. This score is assigned to all relevant firms listed in the news report. The sentiment score ranges from 0 to 100, with a value below (above) 50 indicating the negative (positive) sentiment of a given news. A score of 50 represents a neutral sentiment. To facilitate our empirical analysis, we minus 50 from the news sentiment scores and scale it by 50. After the adjustment, the adjusted sentiment scores fall in an interval between -1 and 1.
The news sentiment score is economically intuitive. For example, a firm has a news sentiment score of -0.2 for a news article about its analyst downgrade from "Buy to a Neutral".
In terms of relative magnitude, the firm may obtain a more negative news sentiment score such as -0.4 if the analyst downgrade is from "Strong Buy to a Strong Sell". For complicated news stories including financial variables and economic indicators, the news sentiment score can intellectually measure the percentage change between announced actual figures and the market consensus (or any other benchmarks). For example, a firm beating earnings by 70% may enjoy a news sentiment score of 0.6 while the firm exceeding a benchmark by 1% may have a news sentiment score of 0.1.
We exclude repeated news by setting the event novelty score (ENS) provided by RavenPack to be 100, which captures only fresh news about a firm. As such, the cross-sectional pattern of news is unlikely to be driven by reproduction or re-dissemination of the same or similar articles.
Our main analysis is conducted at the monthly frequency. To obtain monthly observations, we calculate the sum of news sentiment scores for each firm over all the news events during the month and then use this number scaled by the number of news as the key measure of news sentiment (News). The news score is set to be zero if there is no news for a firm in a particular month.
To differentiate news articles with respect to their relevance to firms' fundamentals, we split news articles into two groups: hard news and soft news. The hard news group consists of four 1 For example, RavenPack algorithms can analyse actual figures, estimates, ratings, revisions, magnitudes, and recommendations disclosed in news articles. Its algorithms can also compare actual with estimated figures about earnings, revenues or dividends and produce the news sentiment score based on these comparisons. In addition, these algorithms can calculate percentage differences between financial figures and analyse stock and credit ratings disclosed by analysts. These algorithms can also process information such as the Richter scale in the case of an earthquake or the number of casualties in a suicide bombing event. The use of emotionally charged language by authors is also incorporated into these algorithms when shaping the strength component of the news sentiment score. news categories: "revenues", "earnings", "analyst-ratings", and "credit-ratings". All other news categories are included in the soft news group. Appendix B shows the details of two news groups. Among all news articles, 30.4% are defined as hard news and the rest of 69.6% are soft news. Following the same procedure of News, we calculate the sentiment of hard news (HardNews) and the sentiment of soft news (SoftNews) for each firm and month. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our empirical analysis.
Summary statistics
In our sample, we exclude firms with zero news scores each month. 2 We find that, on average, firms in our sample have positive news (News t =0.083). Another notable observation that emerges from the table is the symmetric distribution of our news sentiment variable. For example, the mean of News t is equal to the median of News t . Moreover, hard news and soft news have a similar distribution. For example, the means of HardNews t and SoftNews t are 0.109 and 0.080, respectively; the standard deviations of HardNews t and SoftNews t are 0.260 and 0.151, respectively.
In addition to these news variables, the table also shows reasonable summary statistics for other variables: next month returns (R t+1 ), logarithm of market capitalization (Size t ), analyst coverage (Analyst t ), institutional ownership (InstOwn t ), book-to-market ratio (B/M t ), beta (Beta t ), idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol t ), past two-month stock returns (Return t-3, t-2 ), past threemonth stock returns ), past six-month stock returns (Return t-12, t-7 ), Amihud's (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity t ), earnings surprise (SUE t ), and ROA (ROA t ).
[Insert Table 1 Here] Table 2 provides an overview of the extent of news coverage for five periods (2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2011, and 2012-2014) across size portfolios. Firms are sorted into size quintiles by their market capitalization. Panel A reports the number of news articles covering a specific firm in a month. It is evident from the panel that large firms have a larger number of news articles. For example, in the 2012-2014 period, firms in the large Size quintile have approximately 36 news articles in a month, while firms in the small Size quintile only have eight news articles per month. This fact is not only consistent with the media literature that large firms attract higher media coverage, but also aligned with the intuition that large firms typically generate more news events.
We also find that the number of news articles increases substantially over the past 15 years across all size portfolios. For example, the number of news articles covering firms in the large Overall, we find similar cross-sectional and time-series patterns for both positive and negative news articles as Panel A.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The cross-section of news
Baseline results
This section investigates the cross-sectional pattern of news. Following the standard method in the asset pricing literature, we construct monthly news portfolios according to firms' news sentiment scores. Specifically, at the end of month t, we sort all stocks into five portfolios based on their news sentiment scores in month t (Newst). We then compute the equally-weighted average news scores for the current month t and future months from t+1 to t+24 across all firms in each portfolio. The quintile of stocks releasing the most negative information (below the 20 th percentile) is named the bad News portfolio, and the quintile of stocks releasing the most positive information (above the 80 th percentile) is called the good News portfolio. Table 3 presents the cross-section of news. The bad News portfolio has a sentiment score of -0.134 at the formation period, while the good News portfolio has a corresponding sentiment score of 0.296. The 2 nd to 4 th quantiles of stocks have respectively news sentiment scores of 0.009, 0.083, and 0.159. To encourage the comparison between the bad News portfolio and the good News portfolio, we construct a hedging portfolio by selling stocks in the bad News portfolio and buying stocks in the good news portfolio. By construction, the "good minus bad" (GMB) News portfolio has a positive sentiment score of 0.431, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
How does the sentiment of the GMB portfolio fluctuate? If we hold the GMB News portfolio for a number of months from t+1 to t+24 following the formation month, the GMB News portfolio exhibits a pattern of news sentiment continuation in the subsequent periods. We first look at the GMB portfolio sentiment at time t+1. The GMB News portfolio has an average positive sentiment score of 0.037, with a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-value of 25.7. The magnitude of news sentiment is economically significant, which is equivalent to the 23.6% of the standard deviation of News. Indeed, this pattern of news sentiment continuation not only presents in the GMB portfolio, any other hedging portfolios constructed by buying some basic news portfolio and selling another news portfolio exhibits such a pattern. Momentum, the tendency of an object in motion to stay in motion, accurately describes this pattern. We hence label this cross-sectional pattern of news sentiment movement the momentum of news or news momentum.
Turning to the holding period from t+2 to t+6, which removes the impact of news sentiment at period t+1, we find that the GMB portfolio still exhibits a positive sentiment score of 0.044 with a t-statistic of 49.8, suggesting that news sentiment stays in motion. Furthermore, all quantile portfolios also show a monotonic relation in terms of news sentiment scores. Looking at the holding period from t+7 to t+12 and from t+13 to t+24, it is evident that the GMB news portfolio has a significant positive sentiment score. 3 For these holding periods, we also find a monotonic relation in term of sentiment among all quantile portfolios, though news sentiment scores of these portfolios converge more quickly.
Overall, our empirical findings suggest the presence of news momentum, 4 which implies that firms with more positive (negative) news are likely to release more positive (negative) news in the future. This phenomenon is likely to have important implications for stock prices, it is thus 3 At longer horizons, news momentum still continues for some periods and finally becomes insignificant. 4 We examine the robustness of the momentum of news by using different specifications in the Internet Appendix Table IA1 . important to understand the economic driving force of the news momentum.
Hypothesis development
This section develops two hypotheses regarding the economic mechanisms of news momentum formation. Our first conjecture is that news momentum is driven by firms' information environments. For example, the transmission of stale news may induce news momentum. In a competitive information market, news is a non-rival good with a high discovery cost and a low replication cost (e.g., Veldkamp, 2006) . This makes the dissemination of old news very cheap. As such, stale news is likely to be disseminated over and over again. In particular, the release of stale information is meaningful when some investor cannot appropriately distinguish between new and old information (e.g., Tetlock, 2011) due to limited attention or other reasons. The repeated news release finally induces new momentum. 5
Another possibility that can link news momentum to information environments is firms' strategic information disclosure. When insiders' disclosure preferences are not aligned with those of outside investors, various incentives can motivate managers to strategically disclose or withhold firm-specific information (e.g., Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009 ). For example, in fear of litigation, managers are willing to quickly reveal bad news (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002) . Moreover, to lower the exercise price of their employee options, managers would accelerate the dissemination of bad news and withhold good news (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) . In contrast to these incentives to disclose bad news early, managers also would like to withhold bad news under certain circumstances. For example, managers suffer a reduction in compensation and face high career concerns once bad news is released to the public (e.g., Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009) . Taken together, these incentives may lead to the possibility that managers who disclose bad (good) news in the past may release more bad (good) news in the future. 5 The promotion of financial news stories might cause biased information flow and the resulting news momentum. For example, Bushee and Miller (2007) and Solomon (2012) demonstrate that investor relations firms spin their clients' news, generating more media coverage of positive press releases than negative press releases. Similarly, Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) and Gurun and Butler (2012) find that when local media report more news about local companies, they use fewer negative words compared to the same media reporting about nonlocal companies. They also document that a potential explanation for this positive slant is the firms' local media advertising. In particular, firms have incentive to promote news stories during major events (Ahern and Sosyura, 2014). If biased news releases persist for a while, it induces new momentum.
Because either stale news dissemination or strategic information disclosures is characterized by firms' information environments, we expect more stale news to be disseminated repeatedly or mass information to be withheld and released sequentially by managers in firms with poor information environments. This forms our information environment hypothesis for the understanding of news momentum:
H1:
The news momentum phenomenon is more pronounced in firms with poor information environments.
Our second conjecture on what induces news momentum is related to firms' fundamentals.
It has been well documented that earnings are persistent, and hence predictable (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, Clarke and Wright, 1979; Fama and French, 2000, 2006; Markov and Tamayo, 2006; Li, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2015) . In particular, Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2011) show that cross-sectional models are able to explain a large fraction of the variation in expected profitability across firms.
If firm-specific news stories fairly reflect firms' fundamentals, the persistent earning stream is likely to generate a positive correlation between sequential news releases. More specifically, positive news now is more likely to be followed by positive news in the future. Therefore, we propose the fundamental hypothesis to explain the news momentum phenomenon:
H2: Firms with more positive news now will have better fundamentals in the future and this persistent difference in firm's fundamentals induces news momentum.
Even though the economic mechanisms of the two hypotheses underlying news momentum are substantially different, we would like to emphasize that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. For instance, it is likely that firms with the persistence of fundamentals attract media attention and have stale news broadcasted in the future.
Hypothesis tests
News momentum and information environments
To examine the information environment hypothesis, we follow the literature (e.g., Zhang, 2006) and adopt several firm-level characteristics to proxy for firms' information environments. These characteristics include firm size, analyst coverage, and institutional holdings. Firms with large market capitalization, high analyst coverage, and more institutional holdings tend to have more transparent information environments. If news momentum is driven by information environments, we would expect the news momentum phenomenon to be less significant for these transparent stocks. By looking at the magnitude of news momentum across groups sorted by firm size, analyst coverage, and institutional holding, it provides insights on the information environment story of news momentum. Table 4 presents news momentum results by using the independent double sorting approach.
Specifically, at the end of month t, we sort all stocks into five portfolios based on their news sentiment scores. We further independently sort all stocks into three portfolios (below the 30 th percentile and above the 70 th percentile) based on their previous year-end market capitalization (Size), analyst coverage (Analyst), or institutional holdings (InstOwn).
Panel A reports the results for independent double sorting according to firm size and news sentiment scores. It is evident that news momentum consistently presents in both the large Size tercile and the small Size tercile, confirming the robustness of news momentum. More importantly, if we look at the news sentiment difference between the GMB News portfolio of small firms and the GMB News portfolio of large firms, we find that there is no consistent difference in the news momentum pattern. For example, at the one-month horizon, large firms show slightly stronger news momentum. For the holding period from t+2 to t+6, however, small firms exhibit stronger news momentum, though the difference is only marginally significant.
When the holding period is longer than half a year, the difference in news momentum between large and small firms becomes insignificant. These results do not provide support for the first hypothesis that firms' information environments cause news momentum.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Panels B and C report the double sorting results for news momentum based on analyst coverage and institutional ownership. We again find insignificant difference in news momentum across stock portfolios with different levels of analyst coverage or institutional ownership.
Intuitively, stocks with more analyst coverage or institutional holdings are more closely monitored by professional market participants. As such, firms with more analyst coverage or institutional holdings have a more transparent information environment. If new momentum is due to information environments, firms with more analyst coverage or institutional holdings should exhibit weaker news momentum. Our evidence is thus against the information environments hypothesis.
To summarize, our double sorting analysis leads to two conclusions: first, news momentum is a relatively robust phenomenon, which is not attenuated by firm characteristics such as firm size, analyst coverage, or institutional holdings; second, news momentum is unlikely to be driven by firms' information environments.
News momentum and firm fundamentals
If news momentum is driven by firms' fundamentals, we would expect current news to predict future firms' fundamentals. To test the fundamental hypothesis, we formally examine whether the news sentiment of the GMB portfolio contains information about firms' future fundamentals. Specifically, we use the return-on-assets ratio (ROA) and earnings surprise (SUE) as proxies for firms' fundamentals. Our earnings surprise measure is the equal-weighted firms' standardized unexpected earnings. In the spirit of Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008), we compute each firm's SUE as
where is announced earnings, and and are the mean and standard deviation of forecasted earnings.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Due to the standard point of data availability, we conduct our empirical tests on the relation between news sentiment and future ROA based on quarterly data. The interesting pattern is that current news stories indeed predict firms' future profitability. That is, firms with bad news stories have lower future ROA, while firms with good news releases generate more future profits.
Combined together, we find that the GMB News portfolio implies a positive one-quarter-ahead ROA of 1.920 with a t-value of 6.55. The magnitude is also economically significant, which is equivalent to the 30.9% of the standard deviation of ROA. SUEs between the good and bad News portfolios are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results indicate that the GMB News portfolio persistently predicts the difference in firm's fundamentals, thus providing the supportive evidence for the fundamental hypothesis. 6
To further pin down the fundamental explanation of news momentum, we divide news articles into two categories: hard news and soft news. The hard news group consists of four categories of news: "revenues", "earnings", "analyst-ratings", and "credit-ratings". All other news categories are included in the soft news group. Given hard news is relevant to firms' fundamentals by definition, we expect hard news to have a stronger effect in predicting firms' future fundamentals than soft news. To test this conjecture, we respectively use hard and soft news sentiments to form GMB News portfolios and compute the future ROA and SUE of GMB News portfolios.
[Insert Table 6 Here] Table 6 presents the empirical results. In Panel A, we find that the GMB portfolio for hard news is associated with a positive ROA at the time of portfolio formation, and predicts a tendency of positive ROA in the future. This finding suggests that positive hard news implies firms' solid future fundamentals. In contrast to the result on hard news, firms with good (bad) soft news tend to have poorer (better) operational performance in the future. We obtain similar results when predicting future SUE in Panel B. Overall, these findings show that only hard news can significantly and positively forecast firms' future fundamentals.
News momentum and return predictability
Baseline results
How news is incorporated into the stock price is central to the efficiency of the stock market. Given the cross-sectional pattern of news documented in Section 3, we would like to investigate whether investors are aware of news momentum. Specifically, we examine whether news sentiment scores predict cross-sectional future stock returns. If news momentum is correctly incorporated into the stock prices, stocks in the highest news score portfolio should have similar future returns as stocks in the lowest news score portfolio, and vice versa.
To test the pricing implication of news momentum, we form a news momentum trading strategy by buying stocks with high news sentiment scores and selling stocks with low news sentiment scores. Equivalent to the sorting strategy discussed in Section 3.1, at the end of month t, we sort our sample stocks into five portfolios based on news sentiment scores. We then hold the good News portfolio and sell the bad News portfolio. Last, we calculate the equally weighted future average returns for this GMB News portfolio. It is noteworthy that our news momentum trading strategy is totally different from the traditional momentum strategy (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993): while our news momentum strategy sorts stocks based on news sentiment scores, the traditional strategy sorts stocks based on past performance. 7 Table 7 reports the one-month-ahead portfolio returns obtained from the news momentum trading strategy. The first column indicates that there is significant news-driven return momentum: the strategy that buys the good News portfolio and sells the bad News portfolio generates a return of 0.696 percent per month (t-statistic=4.31), which is equivalent to a return of 8.352 percent per year. Look at all five portfolios, momentum profits rise monotonically.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
A major concern is whether the positive return of the news momentum trading strategy is obtained from its exposures to risk factors. To alleviate this concern, we respectively use the CAPM model, the Fama-French (1992) three factor model, the Fama-French-Cahart (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) four factor model, and the Fama-French (2015) five factor model to control for the risk exposures of GMB News portfolio profits. Specifically, we regress the excess returns of GMB News portfolios against the respective factors and calculate the regression intercepts that represent risk-adjusted returns, namely, alpha.
We know from Table 3 that the bad News portfolio has a negative news sentiment score at the end of month t. Interestingly, we find that this negative sentiment score leads to a negative return in one month after risk adjustment. In contrast, the raw return without adjusting for risk exposures is positive. More importantly, after risk adjustment, we find that the news momentum trading strategy even generates higher future stock returns. For example, the Fama-French threefactor model adjusted monthly return is 0.800, which is significant at the 1% level. After the adjustment of the Fama-French five factors, the alpha of the GMB News portfolio is 0.770, which is higher than the unadjusted raw return.
Overall, these findings suggest that stocks in the highest news score portfolio have higher future returns than stocks in the lowest news score portfolio, and the return profit of the news momentum trading strategy cannot be explained by its exposures to popularly used risk factors. 8
Understanding return predictability
There are two explanations for the cross-sectional return predictability: mispricing and risk.
The mispricing explanation is that investors are not aware of news momentum and underreact to news. In this case, news momentum would induce price continuation in the short run, but price continuation will not last for a long period, largely due to the reason that underreaction shocks are stationary and cannot last forever (e.g., Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990) .
Moreover, the return predictability implied by news momentum should be stronger in firms with opaque information environments, where market participants are more likely to falsely make an inference.
On the other hand, rational asset pricing theory posits that stock return predictability can result from its exposures to time-varying aggregate risk, and to the extent that news sentiment consistently links to this time-varying aggregate risk premium, they will likely remain successful in return forecasts. If return momentum is caused by risk, we should observe that return momentum caused by news sentiment lasts for a long period and will not disappear quickly. In addition, the return predictability induced by news momentum should not be affected by firms' information environments.
To shed light on the mispricing and risk-based explanations, we conduct two tests. First, we investigate the profitability of the news momentum strategy for longer holding periods.
Specifically, we compute the equal-weighted Fama-French five-factor alphas for each portfolios and the GMB News portfolio with a holding period from t+2 and t+6, from t+7 to t+12, and from t+13 to t+24. The results are presented in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 Here]
The strategy that buys the good News portfolio and sells the bad News portfolio generates a return of 0.243 percent per month with a t-statistic of 3.32 for the half year holding period. At longer horizons, news momentum profits disappear quickly. For the holding periods from t+7 to t+12 and from t+13 to t+24, the profit of this trading strategy is respectively -0.011 and -0.048 percent per month, which are economically and statistically insignificant. These results suggest that return predictability of news momentum is less likely to be explained by risk.
Second, we examine whether the trading profit of the news momentum strategy varies according to firms' information environments. We use firm size, analyst coverage, and institutional holdings as proxies for firms' information environments. At the end of each month t,
we independently sort all stocks into five portfolios based on news sentiment scores and also three portfolios based on these firm characteristics. We then calculate the equal-weighted future stock returns for these portfolios.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results for independent double sorting according to firm size and news sentiment scores. The return predictability implied by the news momentum is pronounced only in the small Size tercile but not in the large Size tercile. The raw return of the GMB News portfolio is 1.262 percent per month. After the adjustment for risk exposures to the Fama-French five factors, the next period return is 1.253 percent per month (t-statistic = 6.44).
These results are consistent with the mispricing view of return predictability. Because small firms attract less attention and have less news releases, so information is likely to be more asymmetric and diffuses more slowly for these stocks. As such, we would expect to observe stronger trading profits for small firms. We find similar results for stocks with low analyst coverage in Panel B and stocks with less institutional ownership in Panel C.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
Taken together, these results suggest that the future return of the GMB News portfolio is only pronounced in short time horizons and in firms with opaque information environments, thus providing supporting evidence on the mispricing view of return predictability.
Future returns on news days and non-news days
Up to now, our analysis indicates that the news-driven momentum is attributable to mispricing, more specifically, underreaction. In the context of mispricing, there are two forms of underreaction that can account for observed return predictability. The first form of mispricing is that market participants do not realize the presence of news continuation and underestimate the persistence of news (fundamentals). The other form is that investors underreact to current news and induce return continuation such as the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. 9 The two forms of mispricing represent two different economic channels through which news releases affect stock returns. While the first channel has never been examined, the second channel has been well-documented in the literature.
This section attempts to enrich our insights on the two economic channels. To accomplish this, we decompose future returns into returns on news days and non-news days. If news-driven return predictability is caused by the underestimation of news momentum, we should observe positive abnormal returns on news days, but not on non-news days. The intuition is that investors will realize underestimation only in subsequent news days. On the other hand, if news-driven return predictability is induced by underreaction to news at time t, we can only observe positive abnormal returns on non-news days. This is because subsequent stock prices will adjust to correctly reflect news sentiment at time t before next news releases.
Empirically, we decompose the return in a month next to the formation of the GMB portfolio into news-day returns and non-news-day returns. News-day returns (non-news-day returns) are the accumulative daily returns for all news days (non-news days) for a particular 9 On the theoretical side, the conservatism-bias model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and the heterogeneity model of Hong and Stein (1999) can account for the underreaction behavior of investors. stock in a month. Table 10 presents the one-month-ahead portfolio returns of taking the news momentum trading strategy on news and non-news days, respectively. Panel A indicates that there is significant news-driven return momentum on news days: the strategy that buys the highnews-sentiment portfolio and sells the low-news-sentiment portfolio delivers a return of 0.324 percent per month with a t-value of 2.52 after the adjustment of the Fama-French five factors.
These results are consistent with the channel that investors underestimate news momentum.
[Insert Table 10 Here]
Panel B reports the returns of the GMB trading strategy on non-news days. Similarly, we find the evidence on return continuation. Indeed, the news momentum trading strategy generates a return of 0.437 percent on non-news days after the adjustment of the Fama-French five factors.
These results provide the supporting evidence on the economic channel that investors underreact to news sentiment at time t, which is associated with firms' fundamentals.
Overall, news-driven return predictability is caused by two economic channels. On the one hand, market participants do not realize the existence of news momentum and thus underreact to the persistence of news. On the other hand, investors underreact to news at time t and lead to return predictability.
Additional results
In light of the evidence regarding the information content of the hard and soft news categories, we analyze how soft and hard news releases affect return predictability. Specifically, we explore whether the effect of news sentiment on stock returns concentrates amongst some specific news categories. Toward this end, we regroup 36 news categories originally divided by RavenPack into a hard news categories and a soft news category.
[Insert Table 11 Here] Table 11 confirms that hard news releases induce significant return momentum. Using the Fama-French five factor model to adjust returns, the alpha (the excess return) is 0.948 percent per month or 11.4 percent per annum. Turing to the soft-news-driven return momentum, we find that the alpha is 0.363 percent per month. The alpha difference between the hard-news GMB portfolio and the soft-news GMB portfolio is 0.584 percent per month with a t-value of 2.26.
These results are consistent with the results of news momentum for both hard news and soft news reported in Table 6 .
Given the endogeneity of news releases, our second method is to use the multivariate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to check the effect of qualitative news on stock returns.
Specifically, we run the following regressions:
Where +1 is the stock return in month t, is news sentiment at time t, and , includes control variables observed at time t. We respectively use five stock returns as the dependent variable. They are respectively the raw return, the CAMP-adjusted return, the Fama- [Insert Table 12 Here] Table 12 presents the multivariate Fama and MacBeth regression results. We confirm the influence of news sentiment on stock returns. The regressions consistently generate a positive slope coefficient ( 1 ), which are significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with those from portfolio analysis. To illustrate the magnitude of news impact, column M1 indicates a slope coefficient of 0.625 with a t-statistic of 2.91. This implies that one unit increase in news sentiment predicts a rise of approximately 7.5% per annum in future returns. We also find that the coefficient of news sentiment is roughly stable across the five regressions. In summary, the Fama-Macbeth regressions provide further supporting evidence on the effect of news sentiment on stock returns.
Conclusions
The cross-sectional pattern of news is far less investigated. Using a comprehensive sample of firm-level news articles, we investigate the patterns of news releases. We find a strong crosssectional news momentum phenomenon: firms with relatively higher current news sentiment scores are likely to have higher sentiment scores in the future; firms with relatively lower sentiment scores have lower sentiment scores in the future. New momentum is persistent and lasts up to more than two years. In light of news momentum, we explore what drives news momentum. We provide two hypotheses. The first hypothesis views news momentum as from opaque information environments. The second hypothesis argues that firms' fundamentals drive news momentum. A set of empirical tests provides the supporting evidence on the fundamentaldriven news momentum.
We then investigate the asset pricing implications of news momentum. The empirical analysis shows that news releases induce significant return momentum. Two alternative explanations for return momentum is respectively a risk-based story and a mispricing interpretation. We design a set of tests and conduct the empirical exercise to show that mispricing or underreaction is the main driving force of news-based return predictability. To enhance our understanding on underreaction, we distinguish underreaction to current news releases from underreaction to news momentum. The empirical analysis shows that both channels play a role for understanding mispricing that induces return predictability. 2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2011, and 2012-2014 shows the average news scores over 6 months from t+7 to t+12; and News t+13, t+24 shows average news scores over 12 months from t+13 to t+24. The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively.
Portfolios
News t News t+1
News t+2 all stocks with non-zero news scores into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ). We further independently sort all stocks into three portfolios based on their previous year end market capitalization (Size), analyst coverage (Analyst), and institutional ownership (InstOwn), respectively. Stocks in Bad News portfolio have the lowest news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the highest news scores. "Good-Bad" is the hedge portfolio that is long in Good News portfolio and short in Bad News portfolio. We then compute the equally weighted average news scores of the "Good-Bad" portfolios for Small/Large Size subsamples, Low/High Analyst subsamples, Low/High InstOwn subsamples, as well as "Small-Large" Size, "Low-High" Analyst and "Low-High" InstOwn hedge portfolios over different time periods after the portfolio formation. News t+1 shows the 1-month average news scores of each portfolio in month t+1;
News t+2, t+6 shows the average news scores over 5 months from t+2 to t+6; News t+7, t+12 shows the average news scores over 6 months from t+7 to t+12; and News t+13, t+24 shows average news scores over 12 months from t+13 to t+24. The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. News portfolio have the highest news scores. "Good-Bad" is the hedge portfolio that is long in Good News portfolio and short in Bad News portfolio. We then compute the equally weighted one-month-ahead average return (R t+1 ), CAPM alpha (R CAPM, t+1 ), Fama and French three factor alpha (R FF3, t+1 ), four factor alpha (R FF4, t+1 ) and five factor alpha (R FF5, t+1 ) for each portfolio. The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. French five factor alphas of portfolios constructed based on monthly news scores for different holdings periods. At the end of month t, we sort all stocks with non-zero news scores into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ).
Stocks in Bad News portfolio have the lowest news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the highest news scores. "Good-Bad" is the hedge portfolio that is long in Good News portfolio and short in Bad News portfolio. We then compute the equally weighted average monthly Fama and French five factor alpha for different holdings periods after the portfolio formation. R FF5, t+1 shows the 1-month average FF alpha in month t+1; R FF5, t+2, t+6 shows the average FF alpha over 5 months from t+2 to t+6; R FF5, t+7, t+12 shows the average FF alpha over 6 months from t+7 to t+12; and R FF5, t+13, t+24 ) shows the average FF alpha over 12 months from t+13 to t+24. The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. means that each month all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their aggregate news scores (News t ), which is the sum of ESS score of all news for a particular firm over a month t. "News-day returns" means that each month all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their News-day returns which is the average 3-day returns (-1, 1) around each news for all news for a particular firm over a month t. "Daily" and "Weekly" means that all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ) at the end of day t and week t, respectively. "Neutral News Included" means that all stocks including those with zero news scores (neutral news or no news) are grouped into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ) at the end of month t. "Decile Portfolios" means that all stocks are grouped into ten portfolios based on news scores (News t ) at the end of month t. For these four specifications, stocks in Bad News portfolio have the lowest news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the highest news scores. For the specification "Negative vs. Positive", stocks in Bad News portfolio have the negative news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the positive news scores. "Good-Bad" is the hedge portfolio that is long in Good News portfolio and short in Bad News portfolio. We then compute the equally weighted average news scores of "Good-Bad" hedge portfolio over different time periods after the portfolio formation. News t+1 shows the average news scores in month (or week, or day) t+1; News t+2, t+6 shows the average news scores over 5 months from t+2 to t+6 (or 4 days from t+2 to t+5, or 3 weeks from t+2 to t+4); News t+7, t+12 shows the average news scores over 6 months from t+7 to t+12 (or 5 days from t+6 to t+10, or 8 weeks from t+5 to t+12); and News t+13, t+24 shows average news scores over 12 months from t+13 to t+24 (or 10 days from t+11 to t+20, or 12 weeks from t+13 to t+24). The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014.
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. (SUE t+3, t+4 ) shows the average ROA (SUE) over 2 quarters from t+3 to t+4; and ROA t+5,t+8 (SUE t+5, t+8 ) shows the average ROA (SUE) over 4 quarters from t+5 to t+8. Total Assets t is the total assets at the end of previous year. B/M t is the book-to-market ratio defined as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity in the previous year. Asset Growth t is the growth rate in total assets. Leverage t is the ratio of total long-term debt over total assets. The regressions also include the year-quarter fixed effect and industry fixed effect. The table also reports the number of observations (NObs), number of firms (Firms), and adjusted R square (Adj-R 2 ). The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Standard errors are clustered by firms. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. Table IA3 : Return Predictability of News-Robustness Tests
Specifications
News
The table examines the robustness of return predictability of news by using different specifications. "Aggregate News" means that each month all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their aggregate news scores (News t ) which is the sum of ESS score of all news for a particular firm over a month t. "News-day returns" means that each month all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their News-day returns which is the average 3day returns (-1, 1) around each news for all news for a particular firm over a month t. "Daily" and "Weekly" means that all stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ) at the end of day t and week t, respectively. "Neutral News Included" means that all stocks including those with zero news scores (neutral news or no news) are grouped into five portfolios based on their news scores (News t ) at the end of month t. "Decile Portfolios" means that all stocks are grouped into ten portfolios based on news scores (News t ) at the end of month t. For these four specifications, stocks in Bad News portfolio have the lowest news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the highest news scores. For the specification "Negative vs. Positive", stocks in Bad News portfolio have the negative news scores and stocks in Good News portfolio have the positive news scores. "Good-Bad" is the hedge portfolio that is long in Good News portfolio and short in Bad News portfolio. We then compute the equally weighted next month (or week, or day) average return (R t+1 ), CAPM alpha (R CAPM, t+1 ), Fama and French three factor alpha (R FF3, t+1 ), four factor alpha (R FF4, t+1 ) and five factor alpha (R FF5, t+1 ) for "Good-Bad" hedge portfolios. The sample period is from January 2000 to October 2014. Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and *** , ** , * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, respectively. 
Specifications
